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§7 8-36-10
Judgment for restitution,
enforcement- Treble damages

damages and

rent-Immediate

(1)
A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon
default.
A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall
include an order for the restitution of the premises.
If the
proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease
or agreement.
(2) The jury or court, if the proceeding is tried without a
jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages
resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy,
if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful
detainer is after default in the payment of rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed under
Section 2(a) through 2 ( c ) , and for reasonable attorney's fees, if
they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default
in the payment of the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all cases,
the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.
Rule 4-501 Motions. (Utah Code of Judicial Administration)
Intent:
To
establish
a uniform procedure
for
filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling
on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and
circuit courts except proceedings before the court commissioners
and the small claims department of the circuit court.
This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of
extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
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(1)

Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All motions, except
uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and
copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of
depositions, exhibits, or other documents relied upon in support of
the motion.
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material
facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of
the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state
the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in
excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service
of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all
supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after
service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided for in
paragraph 1(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a
reply memorandum within five days after service of the responding
party's memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision.
Upon the expiration of
the five day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written
pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision."
The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted
for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts
as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists.
The facts
shall
be
stated
in
separate
numbered
sentences
and
shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(b)
Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The points and
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences in the movant's statement that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall
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be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3)

Hearings,
(a)
A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as
provided in paragraph (3)(a) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of
the action or any issues in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a
written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that
the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for a hearing is denied, the court shall
notify the requesting party.
When a request for a hearing is
granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting
party shall schedule the matter for hearing and notify all parties
of the date and time.
(e)
In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy
copy of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all
documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to
the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the
date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy
copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy
copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time
the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion
shall be deemed waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty
(30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions
shall be hears after that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good
cause shown, the court may grant a request
for
expedited
disposition in any case where time is of the essence and compliance
with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where
the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be
resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conferences. The court on its own motion or at a
party's request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone
conference without court appearances. A verbatim record shall be
made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if
requested by counsel.

Rule 4-504

Written orders, judgments and decrees.
4

(Utah Code of

Judicial Administration).
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments and decrees to the court.
This rule is not
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability
of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings
except small claims.

in courts

Statement of the Rule:
(1)
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service.
(3)
Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be
served upon the opposing party and proof of such services shall be
filed with the court. All judgments, orders and decrees, or copies
thereof, which are transmitted after signature by the judge,
including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments and decrees shall be prepared in
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel, or upon the court's
own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the
cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees
shall contain the address or last known address of the judgment
debtor and he social security number of the judgment debtor if
known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments
or decrees may be made part of the document containing the
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(8) No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
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(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's
counsel shall attach a copy of all previous judgments based upon'
the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to
writing.
Rule 4-506 Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Judicial Administration)

(Utah Code of

Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal
of counsel in civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in
trial courts of record except guardians ad litem and courtappointed counsel.
Statement of the Rule:
(1)
Consistent with the Rules of Profession Conduct, an
attorney may withdraw as counsel of record without the approval of
the court except when (a) a motion has been filed and is pending
before the court or (b) a certificate of readiness for trial has
been filed.
Under these circumstances, an attorney may not
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written
notice of the withdrawal must be served upon the client of the
withdrawing attorney and upon all other parties not in default and
a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial
date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served upon the client
shall include notification of the trial date.
(3)
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing
counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of
his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in
person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings
against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed
with the court and no further proceedings shall be held in the
matter until 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing.
Rule 24.
(a)

Briefs.

(Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).

Brief of Appellant.

The brief of the appellant shall
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contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceedings in
the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains
the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where
they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority for each
issue.
(6)
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citations.
If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will
suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set forth as
provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement
of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments,
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is
arranged.
(9)
An argument.
The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of
the record relied on.
(10)
A short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.
(b)
Brief of Appellee.
The brief of the appellee shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except
that a statement of the issues presented need not be made unless
the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply Brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross appealed,
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant on the issues presented on cross-appeal. Reply briefs
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the
opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to
the requirements of paragraphs (a) (2) , (3) , (6) , (9) and (1) of
this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the
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court.
(d) References in briefs to the parties. Counsel will be
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
references to the parties by such designations as "appellant" and
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
the lower courts or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names
of the parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to
Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence
the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
made to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was
identified, offered and received or rejected.
(f) Reproductions of statutes, rules, regulations, documents,
etc.
If determination of the issues presented requires the study
of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof,
to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a) (6) of this rule,
they shall be reproduced in the brief, or in an addendum at the
end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. Copies
of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
importance to the determination of the appeal (e.g. the challenged
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum
decision, the contract or document subject to construction,etc.)
shall be included in the addendum.
(g) Length of briefs.
Except by permission of the court,
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes,
rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals.
If a crossappeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule, and Rule 26,
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders.
The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and arguments
involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant.
(i)
Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee,
including cases consolidated for purposes of appeal, any number of
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee
may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties
may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citations of supplemental authorities. When pertinent
and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after
that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations.
An
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original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of
the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations
pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons
for the supplemental citations. Any responses shall be made within
7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.

9

ARGUMENT
A.

Crandall's Brief Complies with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because it concisely lays out the issues
for review, the standards applicable to each issue and the
relief sought on appeal.
Crandall's brief clearly complies with Rule 24 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Crandall's brief concisely

presents the issues for review on appeal. (Appellant's Brief
pages 1, 2).

Crandall's brief correctly states the standard of

review this court should apply with respect to each issue.
(Appellant's Brief pages 1,2).

Finally, Crandall's brief

clearly states the relief sought from this court.
Brief pages 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, and 22).

(Appellant's

Thus, this Court

must consider Crandall's Brief in rendering its decision on these
matters.
Crandall's brief contains concise statements of the issues
for review.

Rule 24(a)(5) and (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure state
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority for
each issue.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and
parts of the record relied on.
Rule 24(a)(5) and (9), Ut. R. App. P. (1993).

Crandall's brief

clearly meets the requirements of both Rule 24(a)(5) and (9) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Crandall's brief contains a brief statement of the issues
presented and the standards for appellate review.

(See

Appellant's brief pages 1, 2). Additionally, the brief contains
1

an argument section which contains both the contentions and
reasons of the appellant combined with citations to the relevant
authority in support thereof.

(See Appellant's Brief pages 10-

22) .
Crandall's brief does not possess the characteristics which
warrant dismissing the brief on either Woodcock's motion or sua
sponte pursuant Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

states
All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous
matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.
Rule 24(k), Ut. R. App. P. (1993).

In State v. Yates, 834 P.2d

599, 602 (Utah App. 1992), this Court stated that a brief was
insufficient where the issues listed "do not correlate with the
substance of the brief."

In the present case, it is clear that

issues presented in Crandall's brief directly "correlate with the
substance of the brief."

Therefore, the issues presented satisfy

this Court's criteria for meeting the requirements of Rule 24.
Additionally, in Yates, the court stated that the argument
section of the brief was insufficient because the "brief contains
no authority and contains no meaningful analysis as to this
argument."

Yates at 602.

Crandall's brief contains both

authority and meaningful analysis in support of his contentions.
Thus, Crandall's brief satisfies the requirements of Rule 24 of
2

the Appellate Rules of Procedure and therefore this Court must
consider Crandall's brief in determining the issues presented and
briefed therein.
B.

Woodcock's submission of the judgment to the court for
signing prior to presenting the judgment to Crandall
violated Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
Woodcock violated Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration when it submitted the judgment to the court for
signing without first presenting the judgment to Crandall.

Rule

4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in the relevant
portion states
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments and decrees to the court. This rule is
not intended to change existing law with respect to the
enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall be applicable to all civil proceedings in
courts of record except small claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or
within a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the
court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgment and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the
court and counsel within five days after service.
Rule 4-504, Ut. C.J.A. (1993)(emphasis added).
Woodcock violated Rule 4-504 because he did not first submit
the judgment to Crandall as required by the rule.
3

While

Woodcock's assertion that the rule contains an exception under
which a judge may order the immediate issuance of the judgment,
Woodcock is incorrect in his assertion that the judge did so in
this case.

In the present case, Woodcock's Motion for Summary

Judgment was heard at a Hearing scheduled for November 23, 1992.
(R. 000259). At that hearing, the judge granted Woodcock's Motion
for Summary Judgment as reflected in the clerk's minute entry.
(R. 000264).

In that minute entry, the court states that "Mr.

Anderson to prepare order."

(R. 000264).

However, there is

nothing in the terms of the minute entry which states that the
judgment was to be effective immediately upon the ruling of the
court and that the requirements of Rule 4-504 had been suspended.
It is Crandall's position that Woodcock's attorney prepared
the judgment pursuant to the minute entry but included wording,
amounts, and orders which Crandall suggests went beyond the
ruling of the Court and to which he would have objected if given
the opportunity afforded by the rules.

The judgment is largely

in conformity with the relief sought in Woodcock's Motion for
Summary Judgment but goes beyond what Crandall believes was ruled
by the Court from the bench and is clearly more than is set forth
in the Minute Entry.

Nonetheless, Woodcock submitted the

judgment to the judge for his signature without first submitting
the judgment to Crandall.

This is in direct violation of Rule 4-

504 which mandates that copies of the proposed judgment "be
served upon opposing counsel before being submitted to the court
for signature."

Rule 4-504, Ut C.J.A. (1993)(emphasis added).
4

Woodcock argues that his apparent violation of Rule 4-504 is
excused by the provisions of §78-36-10(4), U.C.A. (1993).
Appellant disagrees.
If
in the
issued
cases,

This section, in relevant part, states

the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default
payment of rent, execution upon the judgment shall be
immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all
the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.

§78-36-10(4), U.C.A. (1993)(emphasis added).

This section

provides for the court to exercise its discretion in issuing an
immediate judgment.
its discretion.

In this case, the court did not so exercise

Rather, Woodcock, in preparing the order and

judgment, exercised his discretion in presenting what he wanted
included in the order without serving the judgment on Crandall.
Section 78-36-10(4) gives the court power to act quickly but this
language is not a blanket excuse for not complying with the
provisions of Rule 4-504 absent clear direction to do so by the
court.

Because the court did nothing more than issue a minute

entry requiring Woodcock to prepare an order for the court's
signature, and did not otherwise direct, Woodcock was required by
the mandatory provisions of Rule 4-504 to first serve the
proposed judgment on Crandall.

Having not done so, Woodcock

violated Rule 4-504 and the judgment should be vacated.
C.

Woodcock violated Rule 4-506 by failing to wait twenty days
after serving a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel before
initiating additional proceedings against Crandall.
Rule 4-506 is clearly a rule of equity designed to protect

the unrepresented party from the potentially harsh consequences
which might arise by attorneys whose skill outmatches a lay
individual that is temporarily unrepresented.
5

The obvious

purpose of the rule is to permit the unrepresented party a
reasonable "time-out" period to obtain new counsel during which
period of time no action in the case is permitted.

When Woodcock

filed his expansive Motion for Summary Judgment without waiting
the twenty days required by the rule, he violated not only the
letter of the rules, but the spirit and intent as well.

He

forced Crandall, prematurely, and at great disadvantage, into a
futile and ill-fated effort to find counsel who could drop
everything and respond on extremely short notice to what was
clearly a massive effort to summarily dispose of a very contested
and complex matter.

Clearly, that is the very disadvantage the

rules seeks to protect against.
Woodcock erroneously argues that the statute should be read
to permit a party to initiate proceedings at anytime following
the service of the notice required by Rule 4-506.

This argument,

if adopted, would undermine the very purpose of the rule.
rule is designed to protect the unrepresented party.

The

An

unrepresented party who has submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court becomes a pro se litigant only after
the expiration of the "time-out" period if other counsel is not
retained.

To serve the motion when no counsel is present forces

Crandall to be a pro se litigant earlier than the rule allows.
Crandall was forced to be a pro se litigant in this case at the
time the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed.

In Nelson v.

Jacobsen, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the latitude that
should be extended to pro se litigants,
6

As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be
held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
qualified member of the bar. [citations omitted]. At the
same time, we have also cautioned that "because of his lack
of technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting
as his own attorney] should be accorded every consideration
that may reasonably be indulged.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) citing to
Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d at 268, 373 P.2d at 991.
Neither Woodcock nor the trial court accorded Crandall every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged.

Crandall's

counsel filed a notice of withdrawal on October 26, 1992.
000089-000090).

(R.

Woodcock filed a Notice to Obtain Counsel or

Appear in Person on October 27, 1992.

(R.

000091-000092).

Fourteen days later, on November 10, 1992, Woodcock filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R.

000135-000138).

A reasonable

interpretation which effectuates the purposes of Rule 4-506
required Woodcock to wait until at least November 16, 1992 before
filing his Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thus, Woodcock did not

accord Crandall the reasonable consideration his status as a pro
se litigant would require if the court follows Nelson v.
Jacobsen.
The trial court did not accord Crandall every consideration
either.

On the day of the hearing, Crandall requested a

continuation to find new counsel who could effectively respond to
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
request for a continuation.

The trial court denied the

In light of the fact that the Motion

for Summary Judgment is the equivalent of a proceeding which was
filed less than twenty days after filing a Notice to Obtain
7

Counsel or Appear in Person, this can hardly be considered
indulging Crandall, as a pro se litigant, every reasonable
consideration.
Woodcock's counsel's actions violated not only the express
wording of Rule 4-506, but the underlying spirit and purpose as
well.

By failing to abide by this rule, neither Woodcock nor the

trial court accorded Crandall every reasonable consideration
which should be accorded a pro se litigant.

Therefore, since the

standard set by this court was not followed, this court should
vacate the judgment below.
D.

The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment because
there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the
granting of Summary Judgment.
The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment because

there are genuine issues of material fact which make granting
summary judgment improper in this case.

Crandall presented ample

and sufficient evidence of contested material fact to preclude
summary judgment.

Therefore, this court should reverse the trial

court's grant of summary judgment.
Crandall created a genuine issue of material fact through
his affidavit filed in opposition of Woodcock's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Specifically, Crandall refutes the alleged

existence of an oral lease agreement between the parties and
denies the existence of a tenancy.

(R. 000262) . Crandall

specifically denies that the parties agreement in any way
contemplated the payment of taxes in the periodic payments.
000262).

Crandall's affidavit restates his consistently
8

(R.

maintained position found in all the depositions that he and
Woodcock were joint venturers in the building and not landlord
and tenant.

When Crandall's affidavit raised these genuine

issues of material fact the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment in this case.
Woodcock's assertions concerning the statute of frauds and
part performance should not be considered on appeal. First,
Woodcock failed to raise these issues below and therefore this
court should not consider them for the first time now on appeal.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there are genuine issues of
material fact with respect to whether Crandall partially
performed the verbal joint venture agreement thus taking the
contract out of the statute of frauds.

These questions arise in

the context of the scope and content of the original agreement
with respect to both the purchase and Crandall's possession of
the property which have been discussed above.

Because questions

of the statute of frauds and part performance have not been
considered below, this court should not address them now for the
first time on appeal either as new issues or as make weight
arguments to support what the trial court did below.

Moreover,

the question of whether Crandall has partially performed or not,
which would act to take the verbal contract out of the purview of
the statute of frauds, requires a complete and thorough
understanding of both the agreement to purchase and the facts
surrounding Defendant's possession of the property, and all of
these facts are unarguably in dispute.
9

With these fact issues

properly (if not artfully) framed before the court, summary
judgment is inappropriate.

This court should reverse the trial

courts grant of summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
Crandall's failure to submit an opposing memoranda should
not result in Woodcock's statement of facts being deemed as true
under Rule 4-501(2)(b). Rule 4-501(2)(b) in the relevant part
states
All material facts set forth in the movants statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statements.
Rule 4-501(2) (b), Ut. C.J.A. (1993).

Crandall specifically

denied many of Woodcock's statement of facts in his affidavit and
therefore Woodcock's assertion that his Statement of Facts should
be deemed admitted is erroneous.

Woodcock further erroneously

asserts that Crandall's failure to submit a memorandum in
opposition to Woodcock's Motion for Summary Judgment is
sufficient to deem Woodcock's statement of facts as true.

Rule

4-501 does not require a party to file an opposing memorandum.
The rule only requires that the opposing party specifically
controvert the statement of facts.

Crandall's affidavit is

sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501.

Thus, because

Woodcock's statement of facts cannot be deemed true and because
Crandall's affidavit creates genuine issues of material fact, the
trial court erred in granting Woodcock's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Woodcock wishes to deny Crandall's right to use depositions
10

in support of his appellate brief while at the same time using
the depositions in support of his motion for summary judgment.
In his brief, Woodcock asserts that under the rule of law
presented in Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr, Co., 813 P.2d 1169
(Utah 1991), that the court may not consider on appeal deposition
which are not before the court below.

While this is an accurate

statement of the law, it is one which should apply to both
parties.

Woodcock wishes to preclude Crandall's use of

depositions which were not before the court below while at the
same time utilizing the deposition for its own purposes.

The

record below is devoid of any reference to a motion to publish
the depositions.

In fact, the depositions were never published

or in any way properly brought before the court below.
Nonetheless, Woodcock relied heavily on the depositions in
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and now on appeal.
Woodcock should not be permitted to have it both ways.

Either

both parties should be permitted to use the depositions or both
parties should be precluded from using the depositions.

This

court should disregard Woodcock's argument that Crandall may not
use the depositions because Woodcock himself is using depositions
which were not properly before the court below.

Moreover, the

depositions when viewed in full context, as opposed to the
excerpts selected by Woodcock's counsel, clearly demonstrate the
existence of the material facts in dispute.
Crandall has raised genuine issues of material fact.
Crandall's affidavit is a part of the record and raises genuine
11

issues of material fact as to the oral agreement between the
parties both as to the joint venture and the right of possession.
Thus, the trial court

erred in granting Summary Judgment as a

matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Crandall's brief is concise.
for review and the standards.

It clearly states the issues

Woodcock violated Rules 4-504 and

Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Woodcock

violated Rule 4-504 by failing to first submit the judgment to
Crandall before submitting the judgment to the trial court for
its signature.

Woodcock violated Rule 4-506 by filing his Motion

for Summary Judgment without waiting twenty days after serving
Crandall with a Notice to Obtain Counsel or Appear in Person.
Moreover, Woodcock violated the common sense notions of fairness
by attempting to gain an advantage over Crandall who was reduced
to the status of a pro se litigant at the time Woodcock filed his
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Finally, the trial court erred as a

matter of law in granting Woodcock's Motion for Summary Judgment
because there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude
granting summary judgment.

Because of all of the errors

mentioned above, this court should vacate the trial court's
judgment and remand the case to be tried on the merits.
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